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On 9 November 1983, as the uranium debate 
within the ALP gained tempo, the Prime Minister Mr, 
Hawke requested a government advisory body, the 
Australian Science and Technology Council 
(ASTEC), to conduct an inquiry into some of the 
politicaf and technical aspects of uranium mining. 
The subsequent report, titled Australia's Role in 
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle is sometimes referred to as 
the Slatyer Report after its chairman, Professor 
Ralph Slatyer of the Australian National University,
Immediately it was announced, the Slatyer 
inquiry was criticised on the basis of its terms of 
reference, the make-up of the ASTEC committee 
itself, the amount of time to be allowed for 
submissions and the overtly political timetabling of 
the whole inquiry.
The terms of reference given to ASTEC  
concerned waste disposal options, how to improve 
A u s tra lia 's  n u c lea r sa feg u ard s  and how  
involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle could "further 
advance the cause of non-proliferation". The biased 
slant of these terms of reference was further 
accentuated in the national advertisements for 
submissions, by the comment "ASTEC will not be 
reviewing decisions already made and announced 
by the Government on the mining and export of 
uranium".
The 18 members of ASTEC, mostly Fraser 
government appointees, are primarily recruited 
from the heads of big business and senior university 
faculties. As such they form an elite whose 
conclusions, while purporting to be scientifically 
objective, are in fact laden with a highly selective 
world view and value base.
Submissions, solicited by ASTEC during the later 
part of November, allowed only 4-5 weeks' 
preparation by interested community groups, an 
almost impossible task in the pre-Christmas period. 
The report was released on 18 May 1984, 
conveniently six weeks before the ALP National 
Conference.
The response of the anti-nuclear movement to the 
inquiry was swift and effective. Many groups voiced 
their concern at these issues and declared they 
would boy9Qtt the inquiry. A very significant
continued over page
Spring 1984 51
'litiative was the establishment of an alternative 
nquiry chaired by Dr. Keith Suter. This community- 
ased inquiry recently published its report titled 
ustralia and the Nuclear Choice which arrived at 
ssentially opposite conclusions to the Slatyer 
quiry.
The most damaging case against the Slatyer 
inquiry, however, is derived from the content of the 
report itself. The ASTEC report has come under 
strong criticism especially from within the scientific 
community in Australia.
Suspicion about the inquiry was such that the 
report was mentioned only once during the ALP 
national conference debate on uranium. However, 
the framing of the conference resolutions on 
uranium was already a foregone conclusion.
The ALP's uranium policy, which allows the 
export of uranium from Nabarlek, Ranger and 
Roxby Downs, subject to "stringent safeguards”, 
can best be understood by reference to the attitudes 
detailed in the ASTEC report.__________________
J he recently released ASTEC Report titled Australia's Role in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle provides a k e y  to  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  
polarisation of  arguments found in the 
current nuclear debate. That key is 
found by examining how it is possible 
for the recommendations o f  ASTEC 
to be in essential opposition to the 
conclusions of the Ranger Uranium 
Inquiry released in 1976.
A S T E C  r e c o m m e n d e d  " T h a t  
exports of Australian uranium should 
not be limited as a matter o f  principle 
but should be permitted subject to 
s t r in g e n t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  su p p ly  
designed to strengthen the non­
proliferation regime".
The Ranger Inquiry recommended 
"Policy respecting Australian uranium 
exports, for the time being at least, 
should be based on a full recognition 
o f  the hazards, dangers and problems 
o f and associated with the production 
of nuclear energy, and should 
therefore seek to limit or restrict 
expansion ol that production".
The ASTEC recommendation is 
obtained from a rather unconvincing 
discussion on energy issues which 
concluded that the controlled supply 
o f  A u s t r a l i a n  u r a n iu m  w o u ld  
" c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to  
international energy security".
Part of the explanation for the 
inadequate discussion in the ASTEC 
Report can be attributed to its term of 
reference. The Ranger Inquiry had 
very much broader terms of reference 
and examined all the issues concerning 
the nuclear industry.
Vertical Proliferation
A  n essential reason for the 
/ A  differing conclusions rests on 
^ t h e  perspective taken on 
n u c l e a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  a n d  th e  
effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
regime by ASTEC,
The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) 
which forms the centrepiece of  the 
Non-Proliferation Regime (N PR) 
i n c o r p o r a t e s  in to  i ts  a r t i c l e s  
opposition to both the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by non-weapons 
states (horizontal proliferation)and to 
the  e x te n s io n  o f  the  w e a p o n s  
capability of  nuclear weapon states 
(\ertical proliferation) insofar as it 
demands of  them effective measures 
leading to nuclear disarmament. 
Although acknowledging that nuclear 
proliferation has two dimensions, the 
A STEC Report follows tlu emphasis 
of the NPR by concentrating on the 
impact of uranium exports on issues 
related to horizontal proliferation. 
What effect the supply of  uranium for 
civilian use has, directly or indirectly, 
on the military programs of nuclear 
weapons states receives hardly a 
mention in the A STEC  Report.
While the question of whether or 
not the nuclear arms race receives 
indirect support from the supply of 
Australian uranium remains open, 
there is evidence that Australian 
uranium developments profit from the 
arms race. The United States is the 
only country to which A STEC  points 
as being a likely and significant new
client for Australian uranium in the 
period 1984-1996, assuming export 
contracts are allowed. The economic 
viability of the proposed Roxby 
Downs mine will be dependent on 
sales of uranium to American utilities.
Although the USA has ample 
uranium of its own, A STEC says "The 
United States and the Soviet Union 
have very much larger weapons 
programs, which may consume 
amounts of uranium comparable to 
those used in their civil nuclear 
programs".
If the arms race were to cease and a 
s c h e d u le  o f  n u c l e a r  w arhead  
d is m a n t le m e n t  in t ro d u c e d ,  this 
statement o f  A STEC indicates there 
could be a doubling of domestic 
uranium available in the USA for 
civilian use. The market for Australian 
uranium in the USA would collapse 
and with it the calculated viability of 
the Roxby Downs mine. For so long as1 
the arms race continues there will be 
increased demand for Australian, 
uranium.
Horizontal Proliferation 
and Latent Proliferation
he A STEC  conclusion that! 
uranium exports should not be 
limited as a  matter of principle is J 
predicated on the Report's analysis of I 
the Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) I 
from which it concludes that uranium 1 
exports would not contribute to the] 
spread of nuclear weapons. The I 
R a n g e r  I n q u i r y ' s  e x t e n s i v e !  
examination of the NPR led it to quite j] 
the opposite conclusion and, whilel
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arguing Australia must institute 
appropriate measures to support 
the regime, it recommended a very 
cautious approach to any uranium 
development.
The definition of  horizontal nuclear 
proliferation adopted by ASTEC tells 
much about the philosophy the Report 
adopts to the functions of the NPR. 
ASTEC says " ... an increase in the 
number o f  countries with such 
weapons or which have exploded 
nuclear devices (is) referred lo as 
horizontal proliferation". In recent 
years, however, there has been a 
redefinition of proliferation in terms 
ol the degree to which nuclear 
technological d e v e lo p m e n ts  and 
access lo fissile materials would enable 
a country to develop a nuclear 
explosive device on relatively short 
notice. This is referred to as latent 
proliferation. The definition used 
strongly influences judgments of the 
approach  and  e f fec tiveness  ol 
m e a s u r e s  a d o p t e d  t o  s t o p  
proliferation.
Pressure.s Opposing the Regime
rhe NPR is a series of agreements and mechanisms established to i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  motivations of countries who are 
signatories to the regime, and to 
manage the spread of sensitive nuclear 
technologies which could lead a 
c o u n t ry  to  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  
development. The primary arguments 
in the ASTEC Report for deeper 
involvement by Australia in the regime 
arise not from encouragement at its
success in preventing proliferation, 
but rather because of the considerably 
added pressures bearing against the 
NPR  since the Ranger Inquiry eight 
years ago. ASTEC's support for the 
further involvement o f  Australia in the 
nuclear fuel cycle is a logical 
co n se q u e n c e  o f  a m a n a g e m e n t  
philosophy rather than a judgm ent on 
the viability of the NPR obtained from 
weighing the pressures which support 
o r  oppose the regime. The logic of the 
management approach dictates that 
the more pressure brought against the 
NPR  the more support it would 
require in terms of Australia's nuclear 
developments. Thus, ASTEC says 
"Australian participation in stages of 
the nuclear fuel cycle in addition to 
uranium mining and milling should be 
permitted where such participation 
promotes and strengthens the non­
proliferation regime.
The following points summarise the 
pressures opposing the NPR referred 
to in the ASTEC Report:
•  Increasing international tensions, 
ASTEC says "while a lack of security 
remains in the world, a universal 
p o l i t i c a l  c o m m i t m e n t  to  n o n ­
proliferation is difficult and perhaps 
impossible to achieve".
•Countries holding out from non­
proliferation agreements. ASTEC 
says "there is a small group of so-called 
"threshold countries" which have the 
technological capacity to develop a 
weapons program and which have not 
made a political commitment to do 
so" (Examples are Argentina, Brazil. 
India, Israel, Pakistan and South 
Africa.)
•T he  further spread of sensitive 
nuclear technologies.
•  Difficulties in verilying no nuclear 
weapons pledges in some N PT states. 
•The existence of unsafeguarded 
nuclcar facilities.
•Politicisation of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the threatened withdrawal of  the USA.
•  S ta le m a te s  in d iscu ss io n s  on 
proposals to develop an international 
plutonium storage agreement.
T he above is not an exhaustive list 
of what are essentially ihe secondary 
pressures against the N PR . The 
primary threat, however, even to the 
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a ty  i t s e l f  
continues to be the total lack of  
progress in nuclear disarmament. 
A S T E C  says "T h is  fa i lu re  to  
implement the treaty provisions is a 
weakness in the Non-Proliferation 
Regime and has provided some 
countries outside the treaty with 
grounds for refusing to join. It has also 
provided ample opportunity for 
criticism of the treaty by some 
countries which are already members 
of the NPT, but which find its 
conditions onerous".
The diplomatic and other initiatives 
Australia can take to respond lo these 
problems are independent of the direct 
supply of Australian uranium. The 
AS 1 EC Report simply reiterates the 
arguments of the Prime Minister, Mr 
Hawke that the supply of uranium 
gains and enhances credibility for 
Australian participation in the Non- 
Proliferation Regime. Yet even 
without further uranium exports.
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A cylinder of uranium hexafluoride fuel — It was this, in gaseous form which 
recently escaped from the reactor at Lucas Heights In Sydney.
Australia will continue to  have vested 
interests in the N PR  because of the 
existence o f  Australian origin nuclear 
material in the world's nuclear fuel 
cycle and by our continued interest in 
the technology of disposal which was 
discussed in the A STEC Report and is 
generally supported.
Pressures Supporting 
Non-Proliferation
y placing predominant emphasis 
on the political motivations and 
m a n a g e m e n t  b a r r i e r s  to  
proliferation, the A STEC Report's 
recommendations for more Australian 
involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle 
downplay the economic and technical 
impetus this would give to latent 
proliferation.
In line with its restricted definition 
of horizontal proliferation, ASTEC
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supports its conclusions by citing the 
success of the N PR  within the context 
of the expansion of the nuclear 
industry over the past three decades. 
Yet ASTEC makes little assessment of 
the contribution to non-proliferation 
by the general dow nturn  in nuclear 
p o w er ,  s e tb a c k s  to  a n t ic ip a te d  
development of breeder reactors using 
plutonium and the weakness of 
nuclear industries, particularly in the 
third world, which restricts the 
financing of fuel cycle developments. 
Economic and technical difficulties in 
so-called threshold states have also 
slowed the development of  weapons 
potential.
The threats to  the medium or long 
term viability of the Non-Proliferation 
Regime are so severe that, while 
requiring the continuing support of 
Australia, we cannot afford to trade 
off the caution detailed in the Ranger
Uranium Inquiry by any expansion of 
the uranium mining industry. As well 
there arc many other issues external to 
the analysis undertaken by AST EC 
which argue for a very restrictive 
approach to uranium supply.
Pressures to Supply Uranium
A  n important conclusion of the 
Ranger Inquiry concerned the 
ability of the Commonwealth 
to  "immediately terminate these 
(nuclear) activities, permanently, 
indefinitely, or for a specific period". 
Under its terms of reference, ASTEC 
failed to examine the domestic and 
international pressures which trap 
Australia into a forced supply 
situation. Each supply of uranium in 
turn induces pressure on Australia to 
continue supply, regardless of  changes 
which occur within the general context 
of nuclear proliferation or the overall 
world situation, in particular, supply, 
o nce  c o n t r a c te d  fo r  f ro m  any 
particular country, becomes virtually 
unstoppable except for reasons 
d e ta i led  in b i la te ra l  and  non­
proliferation agreements, regardless of 
other international considerations. 
Such difficulties in the current dispute 
with France over nuclear testing in the 
Pacific have put to rest the once 
popular "leverage" arguments of the 
Hawke government.
Conclusion
hile the ASTEC Report does 
an  excellent jo b  of detailing 
the school of thought on the 
N PR  advocated by the international 
nuclear fraternity, it fails to displace 
the pre-eminence of  the findings of the 
Ranger Uranium Inquiry. Consensus 
demands that an Environmental 
Inquiry be undertaken on the Roxby 
Downs proposal, thus allowing invest­
igation of the full range of nuclear 
issues which have arisen in the eight 
years since the Ranger Inquiry, with 
time allowed for the participation of 
the whole Australian community. This 
au tho r  believes the balance of 
argument comes down firmly on the 
side of the position which concludes 
"leave uranium in the ground”.
Ron Leeks, B.Sc., M.Sc., Dip,Ed,, 
has worked as an organiser for the 
Campaign Against Nuclear Power 
(Q ld) and maintains an active 
In terest in the global nuclear system 
and the anti-nuclear and peace 
movements.
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